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The process of opening and integration into the world economy in the CIS countries has been part of a 
more complex process of transition from the planned to market economy. Over the last 10 years most 
of these countries have liberalized their trade regimes versus non-CIS countries, introduced their own 
currency, and to some extent liberalized flows of direct and portfolio investment. These and other 
reforms were accompanied by a pronounced output decline, an increase in poverty rates and inequality 
indexes. Of course, most of these changes in output and income inequality are attributable to the 
transition process. However, it is still interesting to know whether globalization and trade opening 
have enhanced or, on the contrary, decreased the negative effect of transition on incomes in transition 
countries. Comparison of outcomes in various countries suggests that trade policy per se was less 
important than the ability of governments to enforce it. Countries, where reforms were implemented 
slowly, but the government institutions did not collapse, experienced smaller overall output decline, 
and smaller increase in inequality. Countries with weak governments often performed as “passive 
globalizers”: the trade-to-GDP ratios in them were quite high, partly accounting for capital flight. In 
contrast to active globalizers, output in these countries declined, while poverty and inequality 
increased. However, the worst results were seen in countries cut off from international trade, because 
of being landlocked or at war or in bad economic relations with the neighboring countries.  
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Introduction 
The last 15-20 years are often called the years of globalization. Over this period, many countries 
have dismantled their barriers to international trade in goods and services and financial flows. At the 
same time, technological progress has led to a serious decrease in transportation costs, and 
particularly in the costs of information exchange. As a result, the size of the world trade in goods and 
services has dramatically increased, as have the number and scope of operations of multinational 
corporations. In  the 1990s, financial flows also became globalized, and world-wide mobility of 
portfolio investment soared. Moreover, globalization became more than a purely economic 
phenomenon. Not only corporations but also NGOs have started to operate globally in the last 10-20 
years. 
 Globalization has been accompanied by massive changes in economic specialization, income 
inequality and poverty among and within countries. In developed countries, globalization is often 
believed to lead to an increase in income inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. This popular 
belief was questioned by some economists, who argued that an income inequality surge was 
observed only in the US and the UK, and the differences in labor market reactions to globalization 
cannot be explained using trade theory arguments. Alternative explanations include influence on 
inequality of technology  progress, or changes on the labor market (Aghion 2001, Atkinson 1999). 
As regards developing countries, it is not clear how globalization has affected inequality in them. As 
Dollar and Kraay (2001) show, changes in inequality vary greatly across countries which have 
stepped up their integration into the word economy over the last 20 years. The effect of globalization 
on growth and poverty is more clear, though: growth rates in globalizer countries increase with an 
increase in trade flows, and such acceleration of growth leads to a massive decrease in world-wide 
poverty. 
Transition countries of the CIS were not left out of the globalization process. The Soviet 
Union was a rather closed economy with a state monopoly on international trade, non-convertible 
currency and state control over foreign direct investment. Countries which emerged after its 
disintegration have a much weaker regulation of foreign trade, foreign exchange and foreign capital 
flows. The breakup of the USSR has brought about an increase in trade, capital flows and travel of 
individuals from CIS to non-CIS countries, although trade among the CIS countries somewhat 
decreased. This paper looks at changes in growth, inequality and poverty in the CIS countries to find 
out whether any of those changes have resulted from changes in trade policy and globalization or 
have been caused by other factors.   
This paper is closely related to two strands of literature: that studying the effect of 
globalization on growth and inequality,3 and literature,  which tries to answer the question which 
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factors – institutions, trade policy, or geography – mainly affect a country’s ability to grow. 
Recently, Dollar and Kraay (2002) argued  that changes in trade policy have a much stronger effect 
on growth than changes in institutions. Their approach was questioned by Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2002), who showed that institutions have the largest direct effect on income, while 
geography and trade affect income mainly via the quality of institutions.  
The experience of transition countries seems to suggest that the effects of globalization 
largely depend on the quality of institutions. The best results among transition countries in terms of 
growth have been achieved by Central and East European countries, joined by China and Vietnam in 
Asia. Both sets of countries can be viewed as “globalizers”: they have both reduced trade barriers 
and secured the world’s highest ratios of FDI to GDP. Asian countries, however, are still relatively 
closed to international trade and foreign capital flows. At least, the level of protection against 
imports or of capital controls in China is higher than in Russia, whose growth and poverty reduction 
performance in the last 10 years has been much more modest than that of China. It is often argued 
that the decisive factors of success or failure of growth in transition economies during the first 10 
years of transition were the quality of government institutions, their ability to prevent disorganization 
of the economy at the beginning of transition and to guarantee both domestic and foreign investors 
property rights protection (Blanchard Kremer 1997, Roland 2000, Popov 2000, Sonin 1999, Bergloef 
and Bolton 2002, Yudaeva et al. 2002). This paper argues that the same factors have affected the 
ability of transition economies to benefit from globalization. 
While in all CIS countries regulation of international trade and capital flows is more liberal 
than was the case in the USSR, regulations still vary significantly across countries. In Belarus, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan there is a variety of non-tariff barriers to international trade, state 
control over production of and international trade in a number of goods, restrictions on convertibility 
of local currency and capital flow controls. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova are 
members of the WTO. They have no non-tariff barriers to trade, and tariffs on imports to these 
countries are very low. At the same time, countries, which pursued more active trade policies, were 
not the most successful in the first ten years of transition.  
The reason behind better performance of less liberal countries seems to be the ability of their 
governments to prevent their own, and, more generally, economic disorganization. It was mostly 
slow  reformers that managed to do it, but not all of them. In any case, trade policy and globalization 
by itself were surely a much less important factor of countries’ performance than institutional 
transition. In the future, when the quality of institutions improves, trade policy may become a more 
important determinant of economic development. However, geographic location and relationships 
with neighboring countries also affect this process. For example, Kyrgyzstan, the first WTO member 
among the CIS countries, and the country known to be a fast reformer, might have been unable to 
increase its trade flows and attract much FDI in recent years because of protectionists policies of 
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neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and restrictions on transit of Kyrgyz goods imposed by 
these countries. 
 What effect does globalization have on countries with bad institutions? Experience of the 
CIS countries, for example of Russia,  shows that they can suffer from “passive liberalization”. Due 
to the weakness and corruption of customs authorities in such countries, import levels can be higher, 
and tariff collection lower than the current tariff regime allows. This may result in a substantial 
increase in trade flows, a part of which finances capital flight. However, in contrast to “active 
globalizers”, such countries fail to reorient their exports from extractive to manufacturing industries. 
Weak institutions are also a barrier to FDI inflows, even in the most profitable extractive sectors. 
Experience of Russia shows that income inequality in such countries may assume enormous 
proportions because of the increased gap between incomes in exporting and importing industries, 
which is not compensated by inter-sectoral labor mobility or a well-functioning social security 
system. As shown by Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2002), such an increase in inequality can lead to a 
rise in poverty rates. Only countries with strong governments, which can control integration and 
guarantee protection of foreign investor rights, can benefit from globalization in terms of output 
growth without aggravating income inequality.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a detailed analysis of trade policies, 
output and inequality in the CIS countries, and argues that trade policy by itself was only a minor 
factor of output and inequality changes which occurred in the CIS countries in the 1990s. Section 2 
uses an example of Russia to show what effect globalization may have on output, inequality and 
poverty under the conditions of weak institutions. Section 3 refers to cross-regional Russian data to 
demonstrate that globalization may be beneficial for CIS countries subject to institutional 
improvements. Section 4 argues, however, that landlocked countries may have difficulty benefiting 
from liberalization because of their geographic position. Section 5 concludes and provides 
suggestions for further research in this area. 
 Cross-country evidence. 
 
In their study of economic effects of globalization, Dollar and Kraay (2001) show that in the last 20 
years developing countries which liberalized their trade policy and increased the volume of trade 
with other countries, have been more successful economically than the countries which continued 
protectionist policies. Countries, which opened their economies, have experienced an increase in 
growth rates and a decrease in poverty rates in comparison with the preceding periods.  Since the list 
of these countries includes China and India, globalization has resulted in a massive decrease in the 
world poverty in the last 20 years. Dollar and Kraay (2001) refer to countries, which opened  their 
economies, as globalizers. 
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 When judged by policy measures taken during the 1990s, most of the CIS countries can also 
be viewed as globalizers. By 2002 only one country, Turkmenistan, has kept pervasive state control 
over international trade, and massive restrictions on convertibility of foreign exchange. Two other 
countries with massive government  intervention in international trade activities, and a non-
transparent foreign exchange regime are Uzbekistan and Belarus. All other countries have 
convertible currency and almost no government control over trade flows. Some countries, such as  
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova, have already become members of the WTO and have very low 
level of tariff protection. Among the remaining countries, several regard WTO accession as their 
political priority, lowering their tariff barriers in the last few years. For example, in Russia  the 
average tariff rate was 9.1% in 2000, and in the Kyrgyz Republic - 5.15% in 2001, which is 
comparable and below the levels observed in countries, classified as globalizers by Dollar and Kraay 
(2001).4  
 Liberalization of foreign trade policy by the CIS countries was accompanied by an increase in 
trade flows with non-CIS countries. This increase in trade was often comparable to that seen in 
globalizer countries (see Table 2). For example, in Russia, the ratio of trade with non-CIS countries 
to GDP increased from 15% in 19855 to about 40% in 1999, while globalizers showed an increase 
from 16% in 1970 to the average of 33% in the 1990 (Dollar and Kraay, 2001). At the same time, 
intra-CIS trade dropped drastically (Djankov, Freund 2001). Only in Belarus the share of CIS in total 
exports increased from 1989 to 2001, while in all other CIS countries it decreased, in some - by more 
than a half. Some decline in intra-CIS trade was economically rational: in Soviet times the republics 
of the USSR traded too much with each other, and too little with other countries. However, not in all 
cases the magnitude and pace of decline were economically desirable. While the decline in the share 
of the CIS in Kazakh exports from 75% to 26% resulted from reorientation of exports to the West 
following development of new oil fields and was, thus, beneficial for the economy, this was not the 
case in Armenia, where the share of the CIS in exports fell from 73% to 37%, and in Moldavia, 
which showed a fall of the CIS share from 83% to 58% (Table 2.1). Nowadays, most of the CIS 
countries are quite open both in terms of trade policy and trade flows. Overall, the ratio of trade to 
GDP in the CIS countries is rather high by international standards (Table 2), often exceeding 100%.  
The ratio of trade to GDP does not depend on trade policy, however. According to World Bank data, 
in countries with the most liberal trade policies6 the average trade in goods and services to GDP ratio 
in 1999 was equal to 88%, which is slightly lower than the average trade-to-GDP ratio in countries 
with the least liberal trade policies (89%).7 The highest ratio of 99% was observed in the 
intermediate group of countries.8 However, in 1997-1999  the most liberal countries still had the 
                                                 
4 In Table 1 presents classification of the CIS countries’ trade policies, as reported in EBRD (2002). 
5 Actually, this is a USSR trade/NMP ratio. 
6 EBRD index 4 and 4+ 
7 EBRD index from 1 to 2+ 
8 Source of the data: World Bank WDI dataset. 
 6 
lowest average trade-to-GDP ratio, while the highest ratio was observed in countries with the least 
open policies.  Moreover, two of the three countries with the least liberal policies, Belarus and 
Turkmenistan, have the ratio of trade in goods and services to GDP above 1, while only one country 
of the most liberal group shows such a high ratio. The least open country, however, is Uzbekistan, 
with the trade-to-GDP ratio of 0.37 in 1999. World Bank series of trade in goods and services were 
not available for years after 1999, and I had to use a somewhat different EBRD series of merchandise 
trade. EBRD data for 2000-2001 show that the trade-to-GDP ratio in countries with liberal policies 
decreased further over that period, but increased in countries with non-liberal policies. The average 
ratios for the three groups of countries for 2000-2001 are as follows: 0.65 in the most liberal 
countries, 0.95 in the intermediate group, and 1.26 in the least liberal group.9 Since most of the 
countries in the most liberal group are landlocked and often surrounded by less liberal countries, the 
decline in the trade-to-GDP ratio in these countries may result from protectionist policies pursued by 
their neighbors. Section 4 will consider this subject in more detail. 
 As mentioned above, in addition to current account liberalization in the 1990s, the CIS 
countries undertook impressive liberalization of capital account. In the Soviet Union, the national 
currency was non-convertible, while national currencies of most of the CIS countries are convertible 
now. The inflow of foreign capital to the Soviet Union was prohibited or at least strongly regulated 
by the state on a case-by case basis. The first steps to liberalize FDI inflow were taken as early as the 
last years of the USSR, with most of the CIS countries liberalizing the FDI regime even further. 
Some legal obstacles to inflows of FDI still exist in most CIS countries, but these obstacles are 
usually not higher than in countries which have been very successful in attracting FDI recently, such 
as China. Nonetheless, in terms of attracting foreign direct investment, the achievements of the CIS 
countries were quite modest by standards of transition economies (Table 3).  In 2000 and 2001 net 
average FDI inflows  to these countries were 3.2% and 3.1 % of GDP respectively.10 This is, of 
course, much higher than the average for developing countries, but substantially lower than 5.5% and 
4.9%, observed in countries of Central-Eastern Europe, and Baltics, and even lower than 3.9% and 
5.0% registered in South-Eastern European countries. What is even more worrisome, however, is 
that most of FDI has gone to oil and gas rich Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, while FDI 
inflows to countries poor in natural resource have been quite insignificant.  
 Portfolio investments in the CIS countries were quite modest. The only country which 
attracted significant amounts of portfolio investment is Russia. According to Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, 
and Zettelmeyer (2002), Russia is the only transition economy, where portfolio investment was 
higher than direct investment in some periods of the 1990s. Importantly, shares in the largest and the 
                                                 
9 In EBRD data the ratio of trade to GDP in Uzbekistan is substantially higher than in World Bank data. Since 
Uzbekistan has a multiple exchange rate system, the discrepancy may be due to use by EBRD and the World Bank of 
different exchange rates to construct GDP in current dollars. I constructed GDP in dollars for 2000 and 2001 using GDP 
in national currencies and average annual exchange rates as reported by the EBRD (2002). 
10 Gross FDI inflows to GDP ratio is somewhat higher: in 2000-2001 Russia made some FDI abroad. 
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most successful Russian companies are now traded in US markets. Another specific feature of Russia 
is that in the last couple of years its outward FDI has exceeded FDI inflows. 
 While trade and portfolio investment in many CIS countries has been quite low, a number of 
the CIS countries received direct transfers from abroad. In addition to loans and grants from 
international financial institutions, private transfers were common, at least in some countries. For 
example, in Armenia a sizable proportion of such grants came from Armenian diaspora in Western 
countries, but much more often money was sent to their families by labor migrants, who went to 
work in other CIS countries. While the breakup of the Soviet Union has led to a decrease in trade 
between the former republics, it has also given rise to this new labor migration phenomenon. Many 
citizens of the CIS countries, who were unable to earn a living in their own countries, went to other 
countries of the former USSR, mainly to Russia, where they had better chances of getting a job, 
although frequently an illegal one. The Russian construction sector attracted most of such cheap 
labor from the CIS countries. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any reliable estimates of the number 
of such migrants. There is no doubt, however, that this phenomenon has helped to reduce the poverty 
rate in some of the poorest CIS countries, such as Armenia, Moldova and Turkmenistan. 
 As is well known, in the early 1990s all CIS countries experienced substantial output decline. 
The smallest total decline of slightly more than 16% was registered in Uzbekistan, while the largest 
decline was seen in Georgia, where GDP decreased by more than 75% over that period. Of course, 
external liberalization cannot take all the blame for this output performance. External liberalization 
was only a small part of the multi-faceted process of transition from the planned to market economy, 
which CIS countries embarked on in the early 1990s. This process involves reduction of the role of 
the state in all areas of the economy, not only in external relations. Some countries were affected by 
military conflicts at the beginning of transition, and it is those countries which experienced the 
deepest decline. The question that is interesting to answer is to what extent globalization intensified 
or reduced the impact of other factors. 
Literature provides several explanations of difference in growth patterns of transition 
economies. According to the first one, countries with bad initial conditions, i.e. with a lower initial 
degree of liberalization of the economy, a higher dependence on trade within the SMEA and USSR, 
and longer years under Communism, experienced a deeper fall in output at the beginning of 
transition.11  So, according to this explanation, it is terms of trade shock, which followed installment 
of barriers to CIS trade, that adversely affected these countries’ output. The second set of 
explanations says that more active reformers were able to return to the growth path faster and to 
grow faster.12 So this strand of literature suggests that trade liberalization and globalization positively 
affect growth of transition economies. Unfortunately, while these two theories may be appropriate 
for explaining differences between CEE and CIS countries, they fail to explain the differences in 
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growth patterns among the CIS countries. Direct comparison of growth performance of countries 
with different external liberalization strategies suggests that trade policies have so far played a very 
minor role in explaining differences in growth rates of the CIS countries. Figure 1 shows growth 
pattern of all CIS countries in the 1990s depending on the EBRD index of external liberalization 
(index itself is reported in Table 1). The EBRD index refers to trade policy in the early 2000s. I use 
the index to group countries over the whole period of transition, because the rankings of countries 
according to external liberalization were more or less stable throughout the transition period. Figure 
1 shows that countries, which pursued the least liberal policies, experienced a more drastic output 
decline and recovered faster than very liberal and modestly liberal countries. The picture does not 
change much after the exclusion of war-affected countries (Figure 2), most of which subsequently 
became very liberal, or if analysis is confined to the post-1998 period (Figure 3). 
Figure 1: Growth rates depending on the trade policy index  
 
Source: EBRD 
 
Figure 2: Growth rates depending on the trade policy index. Countries, affected by a war, 
excluded 
                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Berg et al (1999), Berkowitz and De Long (1998, 1999), Fischer et al. (1996), Fischer and Sahay (2000) 
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
year
19
89
=1
00 from 4- to 4+
from 3 to 3+
from 1 to 2+
 9
 
Source: EBRD  
Figure 3. Growth rates depending on the trade policy index. 1998=100 
Source: EBRD 
   Recently, several economists have offered such explanations of growth patterns in 
transition countries as the collapse of the government and quality of public institutions.13 According 
to this explanation, massive and protracted output decline in some CIS countries was caused by the 
collapse of the government and its inability to create environment promoting economic growth. CIS 
countries, which managed to keep stronger governments, experienced a less dramatic output decline. 
The CIS countries started to grow only after consolidation of governments. The nature of institutions 
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seems to matter less than their overall ability to provide a growth-promoting environment. The 
growth success of CEE countries can be explained by their success in building well-functioning 
market economy institutions in the early years of transition. China, which is also a transition 
economy, has managed to establish a good climate for growth and investment, while keeping some 
institutions of the planned economy intact. In fact, comparison of experience of China and Russia 
shows that institutional experimentation can be more beneficial for growth than copying of Western 
institutions (Mukand and Rodrik 2002). 
As mentioned in the introduction, several researchers have found relationships between trade 
openness, geography, and quality of the institutions. Has globalization played any role in shaping 
institutions of transition economies? The answer appears to be yes, but only in the case of CEE 
countries. Roland and Verdier (1999) proposed a theory according to which it is the desire of CEE 
countries to become members of the EU, which works as an expectation coordination mechanism in 
building institutions in these countries. Since all economic agents in these countries see EU 
institutions as a model of future institutions of their countries, it is easier to make institutions work in 
these countries. By contrast, in the CIS there has been a lack of consensus on what kind of 
institutions these countries need. This has weakened the government and has had a negative effect on 
growth. Moreover, almost none of the CIS countries have ever had independent governments in their 
history and had to build some institutions (for example customs) from scratch. This has slowed down 
a return to growth path in some CIS countries. EBRD (2001) makes a connection between this theory 
of expectations and institution building and the process of globalization. They argue that strategy of 
integration into the world economy, and accession to international organizations, such as the WTO, 
will help other transition economies to improve their institutions and growth rates. As shown above, 
this theory has not so far been confirmed, and countries which have joined the WTO have not started 
to grow faster than the ones, which have not joined or even are not planning to join the organization 
in the future. Throughout the transition period, the slow reformers among the CIS countries, which 
have retained a number of pre-transition institutions, seem to have had better growth rates than the 
fast reformers (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Growth Rate depending on initial government turnover. 
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Source: EBRD. 
Notation: ‘w’ are countries affected by the war, ‘n’ are countries, where government did not change 
at the beginning of transition, ‘y’ are countries, where government changes at the beginning of 
transition.  
 Comparison of inequality indexes across CIS countries produces a picture similar to that of 
growth rates. In the Soviet Union the level of inequality was quite low, comparable to that in most of 
developed countries (Milanovic 1998, Atkinson and Micklewright 1992). At the beginning of 
transition, the level of inequality rose in all transition economies but in different proportions. In CEE 
countries an increase in inequality was smaller than in the CIS countries. In some CIS countries, for 
example in Russia, inequality increased to the level observed in the most unequal countries in the 
world, such as Brazil. Most of the inequality increase occurred already at the beginning of transition 
(see Figure 5 for the dynamics of inequality change in Russia) 
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Figure 5: Gini coefficient in Russia 
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Source: Authors calculations, using RLMS, Goskomstat, World Bank (WB), Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). 
.  
While all data on the CIS countries are of poor quality, data on poverty and inequality are 
particularly deficient and difficult to compare across countries. Measures of poverty and inequality 
are computed based on household surveys. Sampling of household surveys was poorly designed in 
the Soviet Union: it was biased towards working population and had some other faults (Klugman 
1997). Some countries have improved sampling of their household surveys since then, but in others it 
has deteriorated even further. It appears also that in some countries no household surveys have been 
conducted in recent years either by their own statistical agencies or by other organizations, such as 
the World Bank. Two other problems with household surveys in the CIS countries are high non-
response rate, and underreporting of incomes. In the Russian RLMS household survey, for example, 
expenditures exceeds income by about 30%. Therefore, inequality and poverty indexes computed 
using measures of expenditure are considered more reliable than the ones calculated using the 
income measure. Unfortunately, I failed to find expenditure-based indexes of inequality for all CIS 
countries. This makes cross-country comparison of inequality indexes even less reliable. Table 4 
reports Gini coefficients for 1989, 1997 and 2001 in the CIS countries for which the data were 
available. Where possible, the numbers refer to per household member inequality of expenditure, but 
such information was not available for all countries. Where inequality of expenditure measure is 
unavailable, I use inequality of income.  The table shows that inequality increased in all CIS 
countries but to a different extent. Of course, some of the cross-country variance in the measures of 
poverty and inequality can be explained by differences in calculation methodologies, but I believe 
that they still reflect the overall picture fairly accurately 
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While in 1989 the values of the Gini coefficient were quite similar in all countries, in 1997 
the level of inequality varied significantly. The highest level of inequality was seen in war-affected 
Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, while the lowest level was registered in slow reforming Belarus. 
Average levels of inequality over groups of countries with various levels of external liberalization 
are as follows: the most liberal countries show the highest (44.2) and the least liberal - the lowest 
(34.0) levels of inequality. In all countries, the 1997 level is higher than that in 1989.14 
Unfortunately, data for years after 1997 are available only for a small subset of countries. Available 
data suggest that the difference between groups of countries with various external liberalization 
strategies  declined between 1997 and 2001, but the lack of data does not allow  a strong statement to 
be made in this respect.15 
 Cross-country comparison of poverty levels is even more difficult than inequality 
comparisons. The problem is that a comparable poverty line should be used for such comparisons,  
and such data seems to be unavailable for the CIS countries.  Table 5 reports headcount ratios, which 
I have managed to obtain for these countries. The table shows an intuitive picture: countries affected 
by war have the highest poverty rates, but there seems to be no relationship between poverty rates 
and trade policy. Most of the poverty rate increase occurred  already in the first years of transition 
(see Figure 6 for corresponding data on Russia). The main cause of the poverty increase was output 
decline, but the increase in inequality also had a significant impact on poverty. In fact, in Russia 
impacts of these two factors were of a similar magnitude (Kolenikov and Shorroks 2002). Poverty in 
CIS is also quite persistent: using RLMS dataset, Luttmer (2002) shows that after accounting for 
transitory shocks, about 80% of the poor in Russia remain in poverty for at least 1 year.  For 
countries where data from different time points are available, i.e. for Armenia and Belarus, Table 4 
shows that inequality has been  declining in recent years. Since these two countries show substantial 
differences in their external liberalization policies, the decline in the poverty rate seems to have 
resulted from economic growth rather than from trade strategies alone. 
Transition in CIS countries has also led to significant changes in incomes, occupational 
structure and other characteristics of population around the median. In the 1990s, Soviet type 
education and work experience lost value dramatically. Therefore, a substantial share of population, 
which in Soviet times formed “the middle class”, found themselves exposed to the risk of falling into 
poverty. Specifically, those working in budget-financed organizations (teachers, doctors, scientists) 
suffered income decline, and many of them preferred to either change their occupation or emigrate. 
For example, Russian income distribution is currently so unequal that the ratio of median income to 
the mean income in Russia is quite low and comparable to the level observed in some very unequal 
Latin American countries (Birdsall, Graham, Pettinato, 2000). Consequently, people from groups 
                                                 
14 According to some measures reported by UNDP, Belarus may be an exception with 1997 level of inequality being 
lower than the 1989 one. 
15 The largest decrease in inequality after 1997 has happened in war-affected countries. 
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around the median think of themselves as  poor, not as part of the middle class. These people suffer 
from serious job and income insecurity, and such a factor as education, thought to be a source of 
higher income in other countries, in Russia does not ensure higher income or job security. (Birdsall, 
Graham, Pettinato, 2000). It  should be mentioned that the 1990s are viewed as a period when job 
insecurity increased not only in transition but also in developed countries. Antiglobalists consider 
this phenomenon to be a result of globalization, which causes the “race to the bottom” of social 
security standards. Some economists, however, think that an increase in inequality observed in some 
developed countries cannot be explained by the conventional trade theory, and was rather caused by 
changes in social norms as regards equalization (Aghion 2001, Atkinson 1999). In the CIS countries 
the increase in job insecurity resulted from the transition process, and opening of the economy may 
have added to it in the case of import-substituting industries. Failure of the social security system 
translated this increase in job insecurity into a massive increase in income insecurity. However, the 
lack of a properly functioning social security system is often partially compensated by private 
transfers from friends and relatives to needy families. At the same time, workers who can compete 
on the global labor market, experience the least job insecurity.  
A recent study of the Russian middle class carried out by BEA (2000) shows that incomes of 
groups, in which individuals think of themselves as part of the middle class, are located in the upper 
part of the income distribution (BEA 2000). Clearly, this self-definition is based on views on the 
level of consumption typical of the middle class in the West. This part of the population has much 
more secure jobs than the poorer one. For example, BEA (2000) reports that most of the middle class 
even if they suffered from the 1998 crisis, were able to recover soon. Most of these people have 
skills which allow them to compete on the global labor market. While education does not prevent 
falling into poverty, people from the upper part of the income distribution have a higher level of 
education than others. For example, about 69% of entrepreneurs in Russia have a university decree. 
Many educated young people, mostly big city dwellers, have managed to get well-paid jobs in “new 
sectors”, such as banking, investment banking, business consulting, etc. Since many companies in 
these new businesses are foreign or provide services to foreign investors, globalization seems to have 
been a factor increasing income inequality in the CIS and widening the gap between incomes of 
educated people of the older and younger generations. At the same time, job security is higher for 
people whose incomes were positively affected by globalization than for the rest of the population. 
 To summarize, the data on growth rates, inequality and poverty show no or negative 
relationship between external liberalization and indicators of welfare in the CIS countries in the 
1990s. This result seems to contrast dramatically with the results, reported by Dollar and Kraay 
(2001) for developing countries. The difference lies in the institutional performance of the CIS 
countries and developing globalizer countries. Most of globalizer countries studied by Dollar and 
Kraay (2001) had fairly strong government institutions, which, in addition to pursuing trade 
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liberalization policies, managed to create a good investment climate. In most of the CIS countries 
governments were weak, and, therefore, their trade policies did not affect growth. In fact, there are at 
least three countries on the Dollar and Kraay (2001) list, which appear to be countries with weak 
governments, and their output, inequality and poverty indexes show dynamics very similar to that of 
the CIS countries. These countries are Rwanda, Nicaragua, Haiti. While these countries have 
registered a substantial international trade increase in the last 20 years, they have also experienced a 
GDP decline and an increase in poverty rates. I believe that trade flows, as well as trade flows in 
most of the CIS countries have increased not because of the government policy aimed at opening of 
the economy, but because of the inability of the governments to close country borders effectively. I 
call this phenomenon “passive globalization” and in the following section I demonstrate effects that 
such globalization can have on output and inequality, and provide some ideas regarding sources of 
these effects. 
Relationship between globalization and quality of the 
government: passive globalization 
 
In countries with weak and corrupt governments an officially stated trade policy is not important by 
itself because due to corruption the effective rate of protection in such countries can differ 
substantially from that officially stated. As an example, Table 6 reports official tariff rates, and the 
ratio of collected tariffs to imports for Russia. Even if the official tariff rates are not very high in 
Russia, the ratio of collected tariffs to imports is even lower. But even this ratio may understate the 
degree of evasion: there is anecdotal evidence that goods which are subject to high tariffs are often 
declared under different commodity items subject to lower tariff rates.  
 Since trade barriers in countries with weak governments are not enforced, such countries can 
suffer from “passive globalization”. In other words, these countries can achieve high trade flows, 
higher than their official trade policy provides for, but experience no positive effects on growth, 
which globalization produces in developing countries with strong government institutions. The 
question is why passive globalization does not have such a positive effect on growth as “active 
globalization”. To answer this question, I look at the trade structure first. Dollar and Kraay (2001) 
report that successful globalizers have changed their trade and production structure from natural 
resources and agriculture to manufactured goods. The CIS countries have not so far shown such a 
trend. Figure 6 below compares the export structure of the Soviet Union and the largest CIS state - 
Russia.16 The Soviet Union’s exports were already biased toward energy. Russia has retained this 
predominance of natural resources in exports. The only difference between Russian and USSR’s 
export structures is that Russia exports much more metals than the USSR did. Similar stories can be 
told about other CIS countries: in resource-rich countries, such as Kazakhstan, other industrial 
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sectors than oil have almost disappeared since the beginning of transition (Koluzhnova et al. 2002). 
Resource-poor countries, such as Armenia, have experienced a substantial increase in the share of 
agriculture in GDP at the expense of industry (Manasyan and Jrbahsyan 2002, Iradian and Minassian 
2002). In a recent paper, Berkowits, Moenius and Pistor (2002) show that  bad institutions in the 
exporting country create obstacles to exports, and, therefore, to production of complex (diversified 
manufacturing) goods. Hence, collapse of the government in the CIS countries intensified their de-
industrialization and concentration on extraction of natural resources. 
Figure 6: Export structure of USSR (1980, 1985) and Russia (1994-2000) 
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 Another important difference between successful globalizers and transition countries is that 
in most countries of the first group inequality decreased after trade liberalization or increased only 
mildly, while in all CIS countries inequality increased, in some of them quite dramatically.17  Could 
“passive” globalization have played a role in such an increase in inequality? The traditional trade 
theory, for example the Hechsher-Ohlin model, suggests that trade liberalization may lead to an 
increase in incomes of exporting sectors, and a decrease in incomes of importing sectors. Russian 
household survey data seem to suggest that this prediction holds for Russia, but I believe that it holds 
in other CIS countries as well. 
Recently, RLMS, a household survey very popular among researchers, has started to provide 
information on sectors of the economy where participants of the survey are employed.18 Detailed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
16 In the case of Russia only non-CIS export structure is considered. 
17 China is an important example of a successful globalizer, which has also experienced an increase in inequality in the 
last 20 years. 
18 The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) covers about 4000 households. It has been conducted since 1991, 
although pre-1994 data are considered to be of poor quality and do not form a panel with post-1994 data. Data are 
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data on industries are available only for the rounds of the survey conducted in 1994-1996. To the 
1998 and 2000 rounds, I assign the industry where the individual in question was employed in 1996. 
This procedure may result in a completely wrong industry assignment in 2000, because almost 80% 
of all individuals who participated in this round reported that they had changed their jobs since the 
previous rounds of the interviews. Therefore, the graphs below should be interpreted as presenting 
information on wage and income development of people initially employed in relevant industries 
rather than as containing information on current wages and incomes of people employed in these 
industries. 
All industrial types of activities reported by RLMS were assigned to 8 groups of industries: 
machine building, light, chemical, food, metallurgy, wood and paper, construction materials, and 
repairs. Then I assigned all industries to one of the following groups: exporting (metallurgy, wood 
and paper), import-substituting (machine-building, light, food), nontradables (construction materials, 
and renovation), and industries with large trade volumes in both directions (chemical).19 To make the 
assignments I used information on the export-to-output, import-to-output ratios, and intra-industry 
trade index of each industry. This ratios were constructed using data on industrial output obtained 
from the Russian statistical agency Goskomstat, and State Customs Committee data on export and 
import of goods. 
Since wage data in RLMS are considered to be unreliable, I compare per capita expenditures 
of households across sectors where the head of the household is employed (Figure 7).20 To construct 
the graph, I deflated expenditures by the regional poverty line. Incomes of households, where 
primary income earner is employed in the exporting sector, are consistently higher than in 
households where income earners are employed in all other industries, with the exception of non-
tradables  in 1998. The difference between exporting and importing sectors increases over time. As 
mentioned above, for 1998 and 2000 I assign to individuals the industry in which they were 
employed in 1996. Hence, my graphs trace income differentials not so much across industries, as 
across people initially employed in relevant industries. This comment is particularly important for 
the 2000 round, because many people reported changing jobs prior to this round.  Since incomes of 
households where the primary income earner is employed in exporting and import-substituting 
sectors in 1996 diverge in 2000, Figures 7 provide weak evidence that globalization might add to an 
increase in income inequality. Note that since I use household expenditures as a proxy for income, 
the data also suggest that in Russia families cannot fully diversify cross-sectional differences in 
income within families. In terms of the effect on poverty, average per capita incomes are above the 
poverty line (and even above 1.5 times the poverty line) in all industries and all periods, but the risk 
                                                                                                                                                                    
available for 1994-1996, 1998 and 2000. The survey is conducted by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
together with the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Science. 
19 These industries are subsequently referred to as to intra-industry trade industries. 
20 Comparison of wages as reported in RLMS provides strong evidence of an increase in the gap between exporting and 
import-substituting sectors during the 1990s. 
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of falling into poverty is higher for those working in import-substituting industries. Figure 8 shows 
that the poverty rate among those working (or those who used to work) in import-substituting 
industries is close to 45% during the 1996-2000 period, while among those, who used to work in 
export-oriented industries the poverty rate declined below 30% in 1998-2000. The lowest poverty 
rate (20%) in 2000 was documented among those employed in industries with a high index of intra-
industry trade in 1996. 
 
Figure 7: Per capita household expenditure, by industry where primary income earner is 
employed (deflated by poverty line) 
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Source: authors calculations using RLMS. 
Figure 8: Poverty rates by industry of employment of primary income earner 
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Source: authors calculations using RLMS. 
While theory predicts changes in the wage structure after trade liberalization, it also predicts 
changes in the structure of the labor force: exporting sectors should increase their share in the labor 
force, while the share of import-substituting sectors should contract. This may result in a temporary 
increase in unemployment and higher probability of a job change among those who initially worked 
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in import substituting sectors. Neither of the two predictions holds in RLMS. In total, 29.1% of 
people employed in exporting industries in 1994 reported being unemployed in at least one of the 
following survey rounds. Among workers initially employed in import substitution sector, 31% 
reported being unemployed in one of the following rounds. In fact, the lowest incidence of 
unemployment was registered in non-tradable industries: only 23% of all workers reported being 
unemployed in one of the following rounds, and nobody was unemployed for more than one round. 
Industries showing a high index of intra-industry trade are in the middle with 26.1% of unemployed. 
Most workers reported being unemployed in one or two rounds, although 1.2% of those initially 
employed in an export-oriented industry, 1.5% of those employed in import substitution, and 4.3% of 
those initially employed in intra-industry trade sectors reported being unemployed in all rounds after 
1994. As regards the probability of changing a job, prior to the 2000 round, about 31% of those 
employed in import-substituting industries in 1994 reported changing jobs at least once, while for 
exporting industries this figure was below 25%. With the 2000 round taken into account, the picture 
looks  different: everyone employed in exporting industries in 1994 reported changing a 
job/occupation by the fall of 2000, while in import-substituting industries this figure is only 96%. 
The lowest figure (93%) is observed in non-tradable industries. 
 It should be mentioned that the overall RLMS sample is small, and the number of 
unemployed and of people reporting changes in occupation, is very small in it.21 In addition, the 
sample of unemployed and those who changed occupations is not representative as regards industrial 
structure. Therefore, the results reported above should be treated with caution. Nonetheless, they 
suggest that such a huge increase in inequality, as was observed in Russia, can be at least partially 
attributed to poor labor mobility and high correlation between within family incomes. This problem 
may be especially relevant in Russia, because other CIS countries have much smaller territories and 
smaller degree of regional economic specialization. However, I believe that, in one way or another, 
this problem exists in other CIS countries as well. 
 Low geographical mobility of labor in Russia can be only partially explained by large 
distances between cities and low population density,  particularly in the eastern part of the country. 
Andrienko and Guriev (2001) show that a substantial part of the Russian labor force may be willing 
to move but lack financial resources to do so. Many Russian firms unwilling to lose labor, tend not to 
pay their workers in cash in order not to provide funds for workers to move, providing social benefits 
instead (Friebel and Guriev, 2000). Such labor hording, combined with wage arrears, was 
particularly common in Russia and some other CIS countries before the 1998 crisis. The Russian 
production allocation, with a lot of industrial enterprises located in mono-towns where there are no 
other employers, made it easier for firms to resort to such practices (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).  
                                                 
21 In some sector and year combinations, the size of the sample is below 100. 
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Employment in a mono-town decreases the probability of changing a job or occupation (Sabirianova, 
2000).  
 Low labor mobility suggests that in Russia there were at least two sorts of government failure 
due to which globalization has had a negative effect on inequality. First of all, Russia lacks a social 
security system, which would facilitate geographical and professional mobility of labor. Actually, in 
the 1990s Russia had almost no de-facto unemployment insurance, which also added to the rise in 
inequality in the country. The second failure of the government was its inability to guarantee that 
firms meet their obligations to workers, paying wages timely and in cash. Partly, the wage arrears 
equilibrium was maintained by the government itself: being unable to create a properly functioning 
social security system, it preferred labor hoarding, combined with wage arrears, to a more actively 
functioning labor market with higher labor mobility. 
   
Could active globalization have helped? Evidence from Russian 
regions 
The above description of the effects of globalization on the CIS countries does not provide a clear 
answer to the question whether it was failure of the government that did not allow the CIS countries 
to benefit from globalization or these countries cannot gain from globalization in principle. To 
address this issue, I use data on Russian regions. These data are more homogeneous than the cross-
country data, and show a wide variation in policies and their outcomes. 
In the 1990s regional authorities in Russia received substantial independence from the center. 
This was a result of president Yeltsin’s attempt to secure greater support from the regions in order to  
counter lack of support in parliament. In exchange for support, he allowed regions to take “as much 
sovereignty as they could swallow” (Zhuravskaya (1998), Bergloef et al (2002)). As a result, 
regional economic policies in Russia show a substantial variation, which is often greater than 
allowed by federal legislation.  
 Foreign (and inter-regional) trade and foreign investment are two areas of policy, in which 
variation across regions is particularly significant. In the early-mid 1990s, some regions pursued a 
strong protective trade policy, and even imposed trade barriers against the export and import of some 
goods from and into regions. Policies with regard to foreign investors also varied significantly. 
Despite the popular rhetoric that Russia would like to attract foreign investment, firm owners and 
regional governors in many regions are afraid of foreign investors and follow a number of informal 
policies to make their regions unattractive to foreigners.22  Other regions, such as Novgorod oblast, 
are known for creating  a good investment climate. Such a wide variation in regional policies allows 
the Dollar and Kraay (2001) exercise to be repeated on Russian regions to see what effects policies 
                                                 
22 The famous story of Phillips factory in Voronezh, which was sold for US$ 1 because of problems with the regional 
government, provides a good example of such policies. 
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aimed at integration into the world economy had on growth and income distribution on the regional 
level. 
 While there is considerable anecdotal evidence of regional trade barriers, no comprehensive 
data on such barriers exist, rendering classification of regions on the basis of differences in trade 
policies impossible. The situation with foreign direct investment is similar, because a lot of measures 
hostile to FDI are not formalized in regional legislations. Using trade data as a basis for country 
classification is also problematic. The import of goods from foreign countries is frequently reported 
in the regions allowing faster customs clearance and lower tariff and bribe payments, instead of those 
to which goods are actually imported. Inter-regional flows of goods are not reported at all. Therefore 
I decided to use the FDI/GRP ratio as a criterion of classification of countries as globalizers or non-
globalizers. Of course, geographical factors, such as natural resource endowment, can play an 
important role in explaining regional distribution of FDI. However, it was shown by Manaenkov 
(2000) and other authors that regional policies are no less important in explaining FDI patters than 
geographical factors. 
 To classify regions as globalizers or non-globalizers, they were ranked according to total  
FDI they received in 1995-1999 and FDI per capita over the same period. Then, 28 regions, which 
appear in the upper part of the list, and 28 regions from the bottom part of the list were classified as 
globalizers and non-globalizers respectively.23  Both groups of countries look quite heterogeneous. 
The list of globalizers includes both natural resource-rich regions, such as Tyumen or Sakhalin, and 
regions known to be fast reformers, such as Samara, Sverdlovsk and Novgorod. The list of non-
globalizers also includes two types of regions. In addition to underdeveloped Caucasian and Siberian  
ethnically-identified republics, regions known as slow reformers, such as Ulianovsk, appear on this 
list. Data on FDI, FDI per capita, international trade/GDP ratios in 2000, average GRP growth rates 
in 1997-1999, and growth rates in 1999 for both globalizers and non-globalizers are reported in 
Table 7. It turns out that regions attracting more FDI also trade more with other countries. The 
regional data confirm the hypothesis of Dollar and Kraay that globalizers grow faster than non-
globalizers. In 1999, the average growth rate of globalizers was 5.5%, while for non-globalizers it 
was 4.4%. Because of the 1998 crisis, the average growth rate in 1997-1999 was negative in both 
types of regions, although globalizers showed only a marginally negative growth of  –0.1%, while 
non-globalizers suffered a rather significant decline of –1.8%. These results can be criticized from 
the point of view that they are affected by presence of natural resource-rich regions in the group of 
globalizers. To overcome this problem, I calculated average growth rates for the group of 
globalizers, excluding Moscow, Tyumen and Sakhalin, and for the list of non-globalizers, from 
which all Caucasian republics were excluded. As a result, the 1999 growth rate of globalizers 
decreased to 5% while for non-globalizers it increased to 4.5%. The average growth rates in 1997-
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1999 actually declined in both sets of regions to-0.5% for globalizers and –2.1% for non-globalizers. 
Still, even after these changes, globalizers look more successful in terms of growth rates than non-
globalizers. 
 In terms of changes in poverty, globalizers and non-globalizers differ even more. Table 8 
shows poverty headcount ratios in 1995 and 1999. Poverty increased between these two years in both 
sets of regions. However, in the case of globalizers the increase was 2.6% smaller than the average 
Russian decrease, while the increase in poverty shown by non-globalizers was 4.3% higher than the 
Russian average. Dropping resource-rich regions from the list of globalizers produces almost no 
changes in the poverty results, while in the case of non-globalizers, exclusion of Caucasian regions 
increases poverty even further, because Northern Ocetia was very successful in terms of poverty 
reduction in 1995-1999.  
 Table 8 also reports regional Gini coefficients in 1995 and 2000. These coefficients were 
computed from the information on income quintiles available for these two years.24 There is almost 
no difference between the two groups of regions when absolute numbers are considered. Judging by 
the average difference from Russia’s mean change between the two periods, non-globalizers appear 
to become more equal with time than globalizers. Comparison of the 1995 and 2000 ratios of the top 
to the bottom income quintiles suggests that globalizers are more unequal than non-globalizers, and 
the gap increases with time. However, this result seems to be almost fully driven by Moscow, which 
is extremely unequal compared to all other regions, with inequality having increased dramatically 
from 1995 to 2000. 
 To summarize, I find weak evidence that more globalized regions in Russia grow faster than 
other regions. In terms of poverty changes, the results are even more convincing: while poverty 
increased in all regions, globalizers’ increase was below and non-globalizers’ - above the Russian 
average. The results on inequality are mixed and depend critically on inclusion or exclusion of 
specific regions. Overall, inequality seems to be similar in both sets of regions, showing little change 
from 1995 to 2000.25 The only region which differs substantially from all others is Moscow, which is 
very unequal, with inequality increasing dramatically over time. Of course, globalization cannot fully 
explain Moscow’s inequality, but it  might have enhanced some other factors making Moscow so 
unequal. For example, representatives of such well-paid professions as investment bankers or 
auditors are mainly located in Moscow, and development of such professions in Russia was related 
to opening of Russian capital account. Warner (2002) shows that wages of managers working at 
multinational firms in poor countries are much less correlated with the level of GDP per capita than 
wages of unskilled workers. He hypothesizes that this difference exists because managers have 
                                                                                                                                                                    
23 In this section official Goscomstat regional data are used. Information was available on 80 regions, from which I 
excluded Ingushetia as a region, which suffered most from the war in Chechnya. 
24 For other years Goscomstat did not publish any information on regional inequality. 
25 Data on Russia as a whole show substantial changes in inequality during this period, although due to lack of data we 
cannot trace it on the regional level. 
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access to the global labor market, while market for less skilled occupations is local. Clearly, there are 
many more occupations in Moscow for which the labor market is global, which may add to to an 
increase in inequality of incomes in Moscow. 
 The results in this section are in line with the cross-country findings of Dollar and Kraay 
(2001), who demonstrate that in globalizer countries growth rates have increased and poverty rates 
have decreased in the last 20 years, while non-globalizers have experienced a decline in growth 
rates.26 The effect of globalization on income distribution is uncertain, with some countries 
becoming more equal and others less so. As the previous section suggests, low geographical and/or 
professional mobility can at least partially explain the increase in inequality in globalizer countries.  
Does geography matter? Problems of landlocked countries. 
While experience of the CIS countries shows that good institutions and proper functioning of the 
government are vital to economic growth, it also suggests that when institutions are more or less 
effective, then access to international markets may speed up and the lack of it - slow down growth. 
Experience of two landlocked countries – Armenia and Kyrgystan – is particularly remarkable in this 
respect. 
Armenia is one of the poorest countries of the CIS now. Its initial transition experience was 
particularly unfortunate. Shortly before the beginning of transition, Armenia suffered from an 
earthquake, which devastated some parts of the country. At the beginning of transition Armenia was 
involved in a military conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan. In 1994 an armistice was reached, but 
the border between the two countries is still closed for trade, and officially there is no trade between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Another country, with which Armenia has closed border is Turkey, the 
most developed country in the region. Tensions between the two countries date back to the massacre 
of Armenians by Turks in 1915. There is some trade between the two countries, but it goes via 
Georgia. Armenia is a landlocked country and is uses Georgian port Poti for maritime services.  
 Armenia’s major trade partners are Russia, other CIS countries combined and the EU. 
Importance of the first two has been decreasing in the last 10 years, while the volume of trade 
between Armenia and the EU has been on the increase. Armenia does not share a border with any of 
its major trade partners and has to pay sizable fees to Georgia for carrying goods via its territory. 
 The structure of Armenian GDP has changed dramatically in the last 10-15 years. As most 
other CIS countries, Armenia was highly industrialized before transition, but most of its industrial 
firms used imported inputs and often produced intermediate inputs for firms located in other FSU 
countries. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the military conflict and blockade by neighboring 
countries have led to a complete destruction of Armenia’s industry. The share of industrial 
                                                 
26 Of course, a reverse causality explanation - that faster growing economies can  integrate into the world economy more 
successfully, and to attract more FDI, cannot be excluded. However, even in this case, good institutions are necessary 
preconditions for both growth and FDI. 
 24 
production in GDP has declined substantially, while the share of agriculture has increased. In recent 
years, Armenia has started to develop new sub-industries, mainly the diamond industry, which 
currently produces one third of Armenian exports (EBRD 2002, Manasyan and Jrbahsyan, 2002). 
 Armenia is one of the fastest growing CIS countries. It started to grow in 1994, with its 
annual growth exceeding 5% for 7 years out of 8 (to 2002). Despite the high growth rates, Armenia 
remains one of the poorest and the most unequal countries in the region. In 2001, the poverty rate 
exceeded 50%, the Gini coefficient for income was equal to 0.54, and the Gini coefficient for 
consumption was equal to 0.38 (Iradian and Minassian, 2002). Most observers consider a bad 
investment climate and widespread corruption to be the most serious obstacles to growth and 
inequality alleviation. Normalization of trade regimes with neighboring countries would also be an 
important step in this direction. According to Polyakov (2001), opening of Armenian-Turkish and 
Azerbaijani borders would allow Armenia to double its exports, to decrease its trade deficit by a third 
and to increase its GDP by 30%. Opening of trade with Turkey and Azerbaijan would help to 
diversify Armenian exports (Iradian and Minassian, 2002), thereby providing prerequisites for a 
more equal growth. 
 Armenia now has one of the most liberal trade regimes among CIS countries and is preparing 
for WTO accession. If, however, the conflict with the neighboring countries fails to be resolved, the 
Armenia may reap only limited benefits from the WTO, as Kyrgyzstan’s experience suggests. 
 Transition experience of Kyrgyzstan differs a lot from that of Armenia. Located in the area 
rife with military conflicts, Kyrgyzstan has managed  to escape one. Kyrgystan is one of the fastest 
reformers among the CIS countries, and was the first CIS  country to become a member of the WTO 
back in 1998. Nevertheless, entry to the WTO has not led to a substantial increase in international 
trade. In fact, Kyrgyz exports to neighboring Kazakhstan, for example, have even decreased by 50% 
since 1998 (EBRD, 2002). The problem is that until recently no Kyrgyzstan’s neighbor was a WTO 
member. Although Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are members of the Customs Union, the 
last two often impose prohibitive tariffs or other barriers to Kyrgyz export or transit of goods. The 
only WTO member bordering Kyrgyzstan is China. However, there is no transport infrastructure on 
the Chinese-Kyrgyz border. What is more, Kyrgyzstan shares a border with Northern China, which is 
much less developed than the South.  
 According to some observers, WTO accession has not led to an increase of FDI inflows to the 
country mainly because of its bad geographical position, with no access to the sea or a common 
border with major trading partners (Mogilevsky, 2002). In fact, in 2001 Kyrgyzstan was the worst 
performing transition economy. Other factors, such as corruption and bad corporate governance, may 
also play a role, although it is clear that the small domestic market and high costs of export may limit 
inflows of FDI to the country. Accession of Kazakhstan and Russia to WTO, along with 
establishment of transport infrastructure over the Chinese border may help to improve the situation.  
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Conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
This paper shows that quality of institutions is an important factor affecting the results of 
globalization in transition countries. Countries with strong government institutions, i.e. CEE 
countries and China, have benefited from globalization. The CIS countries, in most of which 
governments were weak after the beginning of transition, have globalized “passively”. While the 
share of trade in GDP has increased in such countries, bad institutions prevent development of 
advanced industries, leading to a bias in economy toward over-representation of the natural resource 
extraction sectors. Globalization may also increase inequality: it increases the wedge between 
incomes in importing and exporting sectors, or between skilled labor, which can compete on the 
global market, and unskilled labor, which can only compete on the local labor market. In many cases, 
however, such an effect of globalization on economy is mainly due to bad institutions. For example, 
it is true that globalization increases income inequality between import substituting and exporting 
sectors. However, it is because of poor contract enforcement that production of complex goods has 
failed to become an exporting sector in all CIS countries. Additionally, poor labor mobility, largely 
caused by malfunctioning of the labor market and of the social security system, leads to the lack of 
reallocation of labor between exporting and import-substituting sectors.  
 As regards opening of capital markets, in countries with bad institutions it mainly provides 
more opportunities for capital flight, and in some cases may also attract unstable foreign portfolio 
investment. Russia is the only example of a transition economy, which was able to attract a large 
inflow of portfolio investment at some point. At the same time, countries with bad institutions, which 
do not guarantee property rights protection, fail to attract FDI, one of the major vehicles of positive 
effects of globalization in successful countries.  
 While there is large literature on causes of output decline and growth in transition economies, 
the issues of income inequality and poverty have been studied insufficiently, and there have been 
almost no studies of the effects of globalization, trade and capital account liberalization, on poverty 
and inequality. The greatest problem is the lack of data, particularly data comparable across countries 
and over time. One of the most interesting issues to study in this respect is interaction between 
institutional factors and globalization. Labor market institutions are particularly interesting to study. 
In the era of globalization, labor market institutions and the social security system perform two roles: 
they promote labor mobility across sectors and occupations, and decrease income insecurity. In 
developed countries, there is a popular belief that globalization destroys social security systems. The 
experience of transition countries, au contraire, shows that countries, where the social security 
system works better, i.e. countries of the CEE, have managed to restructure faster and to reap more 
benefits of globalization. So a comparative study of the effects of labor market policies on 
adjustment caused by globalization would help to both better understand the effects of globalization, 
and to reform labor market institutions. 
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 A more general issue of interaction between institutions and effects of trade policies also 
remains insufficiently studied. Recently, a couple of papers have appeared showing how bad 
institutions affect importers and exporters (Anderson and Marcouiller 2001, Berkowits et al 2002). In 
application to CIS countries it would be interesting to find out what particular features of institutions 
in these countries prevent them from developing their economies and increasing integration into the 
world economy, and what effect it has on their poverty and inequality.  
 One more issues, which needs to be studied, is the effect of capital account liberalization on 
income inequality. The effect of this measure is unclear. On the one hand, opening of capital account 
may dis-proportionally increase possibilities for the rich to diversify their income. At the same time, 
it is easier for rich people overcome capital control limitations. Comparison of the experience of 
Uzbekistan, which has multiple exchange rates and capital control, with the situation in neighboring 
countries can give a useful insight in this respect.27 
 To conclude, I would like to say that I do not claim that globalization is bad for welfare of 
countries with bad institutions. In fact, it can partially compensate population of such countries for 
government problems: capital flight is a way to escape some taxes decreasing welfare, and low tariffs 
is a way to minimize corruption of customs officials. However, it appears from the experience of the 
CIS countries that strong institutions, and particularly strong commitment of the government to 
securing a good investment climate, are needed for globalization to positively affect development of 
transition and developing economies. 
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Table 1: EBRD Trade and foreign exchange system index (2002) 
Armenia 4 
Azerbaijan 4- 
Belarus 2+ 
Georgia 4+ 
Kazakhstan 3+ 
Kyrgyz Republic 4 
Moldova 4+ 
Russia 3 
Tajikistan 3+ 
Turkmenistan 1 
Ukraine 3 
Uzbekistan 2- 
 
Where: 
1. Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited access to foreign exchange 
2. Some liberalization of import and/or export controls; almost full current account convertibility in 
principle but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transpared (possible multiple foreign 
exchange rates) 
3. Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; almost full 
current account convertibility 
4. Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart from 
agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in export and imports 
by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-uniformity of customs duties for 
non-agricultural goods and services; full current account convertibility. 
4+ Standarts and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tariff 
barriers; membership in WTO. 
Source: EBRD (2002) 
 
Table 2: Trade to GDP ratio, and Tariff Rates in CIS countries, and Countries-Globalizers 
  Average Trade/GDP (Percent)       Weighted Average Tariff Rate 
 30 
  1970s 1975s 1980s 1985s 1990s 1995s 1985s 1990s 1995s
ARGENTINA 0.113 0.132 0.164 0.155 0.237 0.329 27.5 13.9 11
BANGLADESH 0.103 0.118 0.138 0.14 0.186 0.267 92.7 54.3 26
BRAZIL 0.111 0.107 0.103 0.105 0.135 0.179 45.8 21 11.5
CHINA 0.125 0.141 0.267 0.285 0.301 0.342 38.8 39.9 20.9
COLOMBIA 0.338 0.309 0.334 0.331 0.45 0.589 29.4 16.6 12.2
COSTA RICA 0.745 0.771 0.713 0.82 1.083 1.281 19.5 12.6 11.2
DOMINICAN REP. 0.387 0.315 0.413 0.403 0.563 0.923 .. 17.8 16.2
HAITI 0.322 0.43 0.477 0.508 0.67 0.989 11.6 .. 10
HUNGARY 0.409 0.471 0.484 0.527 0.576 0.74 18 9.9 14.8
INDIA 0.127 0.137 0.159 0.163 0.17 0.221 99.4 61.9 38.3
IVORY COAST 0.544 0.527 0.704 0.675 0.68 0.764 26.3 23.8 20.7
JAMAICA 0.8 0.759 0.765 1.066 1.092 1.259 18.4 19.6 10.9
JORDAN .. 0.942 1.182 1.04 1.622 1.662 16.3 15.8 16
MALAYSIA 0.893 0.917 1.068 1.208 1.739 2.198 14.9 14.3 8.9
MALI 0.286 0.299 0.428 0.513 0.516 0.513 .. .. 18.8
MEXICO 0.17 0.177 0.212 0.232 0.335 0.499 16.7 12.8 12.8
NEPAL 0.165 0.254 0.31 0.322 0.42 0.603 21.8 16.1 11
NICARAGUA 0.491 0.529 0.656 0.51 0.685 0.851 22.1 12.7 10.7
PARAGUAY 0.282 0.321 0.32 0.378 0.773 0.994 10.9 13.1 9.3
PHILIPPINES 0.405 0.416 0.522 0.562 0.755 1.061 27.8 24.5 17.2
RWANDA 0.191 0.229 0.264 0.295 0.465 0.374 33 38.4 .. 
THAILAND 0.474 0.471 0.498 0.591 0.846 0.946 41 36.6 23.1
URUGUAY 0.355 0.426 0.473 0.5 0.664 0.843 33.7 18.9 9.6
ZIMBABWE .. 0.438 0.442 0.448 0.594 0.771 9.2 17.2 21.5
      1985 1990 1995 1999 1993 1996 2000
RUSSIA**    15.1* 53.3 37.4 36.8     
Armenia     81.336 86.115 70.669      
Azerbaijan      85.835 84.453      
Belarus     90.405 104.769 126.508      
Georgia      67.864 73.007      
Kazakhstan      71.091 85.315      
Kyrgyz Republic     78.754 71.826 99.2    5.15 (01)
Moldova      130.343 114.823      
Russian Federation     36.106 52.009 74.453 7.3 10.9 9.1
Tajikistan       131.846      
Turkmenistan      71.071 103.533      
Ukraine     56.363 97.229 104.426      
Uzbekistan       76.635 74.566 37.893       
* USSR; source "Narodnoe Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1989 Godu"       
** trade with non-CIS countries only        
Source: Dollar, Kraay (2001), World Bank, National Statistic Ofiices.     
 
Table 2.1: CIS Export Share 
CIS share in 
Total Export 1989* 1994 1996* 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Armenia 72 73.3 44   36.8       
Azerbaidjan 45 42.1 47  38.3     
Belarus 59  75 78.9 70.5 73.3 64.6 61.4
Georgia 68 76.4 65  55.7     
Kazakhstan 75  59 45.9 39.9 26.7 26.2   
Kyrgizstan 81  78       
Moldova 83  77 69.6 67.9 55.4 58.6   
Russia 30  24       
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Tadjikistan 52  45       
Turkmenistan 67  52       
Ukraine 58  46 39.2 41.2 28.1 30.9   
Uzbekistan 46   54   26.0 30.4 35.9   
*trade with FSU countries        
Source Djankov,Freund, Disintegration ad Trade Flows: Evidence from the Former Soviet Union  
Official trade statistics        
 
Table 2.2: CIS Import Share 
CIS import share 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Armenia 52.2       25.5       
Azerbaidjan 62.5    37.6     
Belarus     64.3 64.9 76.6 74.1 67.3
Georgia 80.7    30.2     
Kazakhstan     54.2 47.4 43.3 54.6   
Kyrgizstan           
Moldova   67.7 60.9 51.6 43.0 38.7 31.9   
Russia           
Tadjikistan           
Turkmenistan           
Ukraine    63.5 57.7 53.8 56.9 57.6   
Uzbekistan         27.8 26.0 34.8   
Source: official trade statistics of respective countries     
 
Table 3: FDI in % of GDP in globalizer and CIS countries  
  FDI avg 80s FDI avg 90s   FDI avg 80s 
FDI avg 
90s 
Argentina 0.7% 2.4% Nicaragua 0.0% 4.4%
Bangladesh 0.0% 0.1% Pakistan 0.3% 0.8%
Benin 0.1% 0.8% Paraguay 0.3% 1.4%
Brazil 0.7% 1.5% Peru 0.1% 2.9%
Burkina Faso 0.1% 0.5% Philippines 0.6% 1.6%
Cameroon 1.2% 0.1% Rwanda 1.0% 0.2%
Central Af.Rep. 0.6% 0.2% Thailand 1.0% 2.4%
China 0.5% 4.0% Uganda 0.0% 1.7%
Colombia 1.3% 2.0% Uruguay 0.5% 0.6%
Costa Rica 1.4% 2.9% Venezuela 0.2% 2.2%
Dominica 2.6% 8.6% Zambia 1.7% 3.4%
Dominican Rep. 1.0% 2.7% Zimbabwe -0.1% 1.3%
Ecuador 0.5% 2.5%     1994-1999 
Eqypt 2.7% 1.2% RUSSIA*  0.5%
Ethiopia 0.0% 0.7% Armenia  4.0%
Haiti 0.4% 0.2% Azerbaijan  16.2%
Hungary 0.0% 4.1% Belarus  0.8%
India 0.0% 0.4% Georgia**  3.5%
Indonesia 0.4% 0.9% Kazakhstan  5.8%
Ivory Coast 0.0% 0.0% Kyrgyz Republic  3.3%
Jamaica 0.2% 3.6% Moldova  2.7%
Jordan 0.9% 1.2% Russian Federation  0.3%
Kenya 0.4% 0.2% Tajikistan**  1.1%
Malaysia 3.2% 4.7% Turkmenistan  3.6%
Mali 0.2% 1.1% Ukraine  1.0%
Mexico 1.0% 2.0% Uzbekistan  0.5%
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Nepal 0.0% 0.2% ** - average for 1996-1999   
Sourc: Dollar and Kraay (2001), EBRD (2002)    
 
Table 4: Gini coefficient in CIS countries 
  1992 1999
Armenia 28.0 45.7(1996)
Azerbaijan 31.7 31.1
Belarus 24.2 28.3(1998)
Georgia** 31.3 57.6(1997)
Kazakhstan 29.1 35.4(1996)
Kyrgyz Republic 31.2 40.5
Moldova 26.4 46.6(1997)
Russian Federation 26.4 48.7(1998)
Tajikistan** 31.8  
Turkmenistan 31.6 40.8(1998)
Ukraine 24.8 31.3(1997)
Uzbekistan 30.6 33(1994)
Source: UNDP   
 
 
Table 5: Poverty Rate in CIS Countries 
  year Population  in Poverty, % year
Living on 1$ 
a day, % 
Armenia 96 / 98 / 01 54.7 / 53.7 / 50.9     
Azerbaidjan 1995 44.7 1995 <2 
Belarus 97/98/99/00/01 32.1 / 33 / 46.7 / 41.9 / 28.9     
Georgia 1997 11.9 ???     
Kazakhstan 2000 31.8 1996 1.5 
Kyrgizstan 1999 55.3     
Moldova 1999 53.4     
Russia        
Tadjikistan 1999 83     
Turkmenistan 1994 48 1998 12.1 
Ukraine 1996 30     
Uzbekistan 1996 22.0 1993 3.3 
Source: Worldbank, www.economic-trends.org   
 
Table 6: Legislated and Collected Tariff Rates in Russia 
CEFIR calculations 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Weighted average legislated 
tariff rates (all countries) 
14% 14% 12% 8%
  
Collected tariff rates (collected 
tariffs/import) 
4% 7% 7% 5%
  
IMEI calculations 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Weighted average legislated 
tariff rates (non-CIS countries) 
15% 14% 15% 12% 13% 
Collected tariff rates (collected 
tariffs/import) 
9% 12% 8% 9% 9% 
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Table 7: FDI, Trade volume, and GRP growth rates in regions-globalizers and non-globalizers. 
region 
Cumulative 
FDI, 1995-
99 
FDI per 
capita, 
cum. 
1995-
1999 
Trade/GRP 
2000 
Average 
growth 
rate, 
1997-99
GRP 
growth 
rate, 
1999 
Globalizers:       
Moscow city                9807567 1147.6 0.75 3.7 6.9 
Moskow oblast            2046579 318.0 0.61 3.7 5.2 
Krasnodar krai            1846136 369.3 0.29 1.8 16.6 
Sakhalin oblast           1682294 2846.5 0.39 4.7 19.1 
St. Petersburg city      1160353 250.7 0.70 -0.2 6.2 
Leningrad oblast         732281 441.4 1.21 1.5 13.7 
Novosibirsk oblast      569896 208.7 0.27 -2.0 4.7 
Tyumen oblast            514291 158.0 0.76 0.1 1.9 
Samara oblast            496643 151.5 0.75 0.1 2.5 
Sverdlovsk oblast       382738 83.7 0.57 -3.1 1.8 
Volgograd oblast         298970 112.5 0.43 -2.6 1.2 
Primorskii krai             260183 120.7 0.40 0.0 6.5 
Kaluga oblast              256978 240.4 0.23 -3.3 1.5 
Chelyabinsk oblast     245633 67.3 0.51 -1.6 8.3 
Magadan oblast          212186 906.8 0.10 -8.3 -3.0 
Khabarovsk krai          188860 126.2 0.59 2.5 9.2 
Nizhny Novgorod 
oblast                186976 51.5 0.32 0.4 3.4 
Oryol oblast                179862 201.9 0.23 3.4 1.2 
Tatarstan republic       175287 46.4 0.47 0.1 7.6 
Orenburg oblast          147274 66.6 0.66 0.3 9.0 
Komi republic              131138 116.5 0.49 -2.0 -3.7 
Vladimir oblast            129424 81.4 0.20 0.9 7.1 
Stavropol krai              125456 47.3 0.18 -1.8 4.1 
Tula oblast                  120705 70.3 0.51 -3.4 -0.3 
Novgorod oblast         103353 143.5 0.45 3.1 6.5 
Average 880042 335.0 0.48 -0.1 5.5 
        
Non-Globalizers       
Tambov oblast            14605 11.6 0.08 3.2 9.1 
Bryansk oblast            13468 9.5 0.23 -2.8 -4.1 
Kamchatka oblast       12600 32.8 0.23 -5.8 -7.0 
Tver oblast                  11888 7.5 0.20 -0.5 4.9 
Kemerovo oblast         10351 3.5 0.61 -1.2 8.3 
Amur oblast                10344 10.4 0.08 -5.2 3.9 
Kirov oblast                 10055 6.4 0.31 -1.5 4.7 
Ivanovo oblast            9871 8.2 0.41 -4.1 5.0 
Dagestan republic       9021 4.2 0.21 -1.8 1.8 
Kostroma oblast          9018 11.7 0.14 0.6 5.5 
Smolensk oblast         8393 7.5 0.49 5.6 25.5 
Chuvash republic        8109 6.0 0.13 -4.5 0.7 
Penza oblast               7368 4.9 0.09 0.6 12.1 
Kabardino-Balkar 3794 4.8 0.04 2.4 9.0 
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republic             
Buryat republic            3786 3.7 0.18 1.4 8.0 
Karachaevo-
Cherkess republic       3469 8.0 0.05 -1.7 -2.8 
Ulyanovsk oblast        3180 2.2 0.19 0.0 6.0 
Adygeya republic        2616 5.9 0.05 -2.4 5.4 
Mari-El republic           2176 2.9 0.11 -0.8 0.2 
Tuva republic              2155 7.0 0.43 0.6 6.6 
Kalmyk republic          1641 5.2 0.77 -3.9 -6.0 
Khakasia republic       1563 2.7 0.92 -3.1 -0.8 
Chita oblast                 1447 1.2 0.15 -3.7 9.8 
Kurgan oblast             1101 1.0 0.36 -0.2 3.0 
Evrei autonomous 
oblast               979 5.0 0.12 -7.3 5.1 
Altai republic               117 0.6 0.85 -3.2 4.5 
North Osetiya 
republic                0 0.0 0.32 2.9 12.0 
Chukotka 
autonomous okrug      0 0.0 0.02 -13.2 -7.6 
Average 5826 6.2 0.28 -1.8 4.4 
Source: Goskomstat 
Table 8: Poverty and Inequality Changes in Regions-Globalizers and Non-Globalizers 
region 
poverty 
rate 1995 
poverty 
rate 
1999 
Change 
in poverty 
rate 
1995-99, 
compared 
to 
Russian 
average 
change 
Cini 
1995 
Gini 
2000 
Change 
in Gini 
coefficient 
1995-99, 
compared 
to 
Russian 
average 
change 
5 to 1 
income 
quintile 
ratio 
1995 
5 to 1 
income 
quintile 
ratio 
2000 
Globalizers          
Moscow city                19.1 23.3 -6.88289 0.52 0.56 0.032688 19.7 27.8
Moskow oblast            31.2 27.6 -14.6829 0.26 0.30 0.034688 4.0 5.3
Krasnodar krai            32.4 35.3 -8.18289 0.35 0.36 -0.00291 7.3 7.6
Sakhalin oblast           24.6 36.5 0.81711 0.22 0.29 0.057888 3.3 5.0
St. Petersburg city      20 33.2 2.11711 0.35 0.32 -0.04531 7.3 5.9
Leningrad oblast         29.1 51.5 11.31711 0.25 0.26 -0.00651 4.0 4.1
Novosibirsk oblast       39.8 61.1 10.21711 0.29 0.31 0.004688 5.0 5.6
Tyumen oblast            19.2 17.8 -12.4829 0.41 0.42 -0.00011 10.5 11.5
Samara oblast             21.2 23.4 -8.88289 0.30 0.39 0.079088 5.2 9.2
Sverdlovsk oblast        29.5 35.6 -4.98289 0.30 0.31 -0.00451 5.3 5.6
Volgograd oblast         33.2 58.1 13.81711 0.26 0.28 0.003488 4.3 4.7
Primorskii krai             31.8 39.8 -3.08289 0.26 0.29 0.019488 4.2 5.1
Kaluga oblast              26.6 47 9.31711 0.35 0.29 -0.07531 7.3 4.9
Chelyabinsk oblast      27.9 32 -6.98289 0.31 0.32 -0.00531 5.6 5.8
Magadan oblast          24.6 46.3 10.61711 0.35 0.27 -0.09051 7.1 4.4
Khabarovsk krai          29.4 28.2 -12.2829 0.28 0.31 0.024288 4.6 5.6
Nizhny Novgorod 
oblast                22 38 4.91711 0.29 0.31 0.008288 5.0 5.7
Oryol oblast                 22.7 35.9 2.11711 0.35 0.33 -0.03771 7.3 6.2
 35
Tatarstan republic       22.1 24.1 -9.08289 0.32 0.35 0.018288 5.8 6.9
Orenburg oblast          49.3 35.6 -24.7829 0.27 0.28 -0.00171 4.3 4.6
Komi republic              19.2 22.1 -8.18289 0.30 0.36 0.050288 5.1 7.5
Vladimir oblast            27.9 40.8 1.81711 0.24 0.27 0.024288 3.6 4.5
Stavropol krai              39.6 45.2 -5.48289 0.35 0.31 -0.04451 6.9 5.7
Tula oblast                  16.2 31.2 3.91711 0.29 0.26 -0.03371 4.8 4.3
Novgorod oblast          22.8 24 -9.88289 0.28 0.32 0.022288 4.7 5.8
Average 27.256 35.744 -2.59489 0.31 0.32 0.001264 6.1 6.8
           
Non-Globalizers          
Tambov oblast            22 27.9 -5.18289 0.30 0.33 0.019888 5.1 6.2
Bryansk oblast            22.7 45 11.21711 0.27 0.29 0.011088 4.4 5.1
Kamchatka oblast       22.7 33.6 -0.18289 0.35 0.31 -0.04691 7.1 5.7
Tver oblast                  28.6 67.4 27.71711 0.27 0.28 0.000688 4.4 4.8
Kemerovo oblast         16.1 27.9 0.71711 0.35 0.33 -0.03291 7.3 6.3
Amur oblast                 37.9 44.9 -4.08289 0.40 0.30 -0.10651 9.6 5.3
Kirov oblast                 32 56.6 13.51711 0.24 0.27 0.015888 3.7 4.3
Ivanovo oblast             33.7 64.9 20.11711 0.26 0.29 0.019888 4.0 4.9
Dagestan republic       71.2 63.2 -19.0829  0.34   6.8
Kostroma oblast          30.5 38.1 -3.48289 0.35 0.30 -0.06171 7.3 5.3
Smolensk oblast         19.8 27.2 -3.68289 0.29 0.31 0.009088 4.8 5.4
Chuvash republic        27.3 68.2 29.81711 0.24 0.28 0.033888 3.6 4.8
Penza oblast               30.2 68.7 27.41711 0.26 0.29 0.009888 4.3 4.8
Kabardino-Balkar 
republic             42.5 46.6 -6.98289 0.28 0.31 0.016288 4.7 5.6
Buryat republic            55.2 50.5 -15.7829 0.39 0.37 -0.02811 9.1 8.2
Karachaevo-
Cherkess republic       45.7 64.6 7.81711 0.28 0.33 0.036288 4.7 6.3
Ulyanovsk oblast         16.3 31.4 4.01711 0.28 0.33 0.033488 4.8 6.2
Adygeya republic        46.4 54.8 -2.68289 0.32 0.32 -0.01931 6.1 5.8
Mari-El republic           43.2 69 14.71711 0.24 0.34 0.083488 3.7 6.5
Tuva republic              73.2 78.6 -5.68289 0.40 0.31 -0.10211 10.0 5.6
Kalmyk republic          60.3 78.1 6.71711 0.26 0.33 0.057488 4.3 6.5
Khakasia republic       25.3 45 8.61711 0.27 0.28 -0.00291 4.4 4.7
Chita oblast                 66.5 88.8 11.21711 0.41 0.33 -0.09571 10.6 6.2
Kurgan oblast              50.4 56.5 -4.98289 0.27 0.35 0.069088 4.4 7.1
Evrei autonomous 
oblast                55.7   0.28   4.6
Altai republic               26.2 61 23.71711 0.33 0.28 -0.06331 6.5 4.7
North Osetiya 
republic                42.8 31.2 -22.6829 0.28 0.32 0.023088 4.7 5.8
Chukotka 
autonomous okrug      70.9   0.31   5.7
Average 38.02692354.15357 4.340187 0.30 0.31 -0.0048 5.7 5.7
Source: Goskomstat 
 
 
